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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-8674
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JOHN ANGUS SMITH, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 1, 1993]

  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We decide today whether the exchange of a gun for
narcotics constitutes -use- of a firearm -during and in
relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime- within the
meaning of 18 U. S. C. 924(c)(1).  We hold that it does.

                            I
  Petitioner John Angus Smith and his companion went
from Tennessee to Florida to buy cocaine; they hoped to
resell it at a profit.  While in Florida, they met
petitioner's acquaintance, Deborah Hoag.  Hoag agreed to,
and in fact did, purchase cocaine for petitioner.  She then
accompanied petitioner and his friend to her motel room,
where they were joined by a drug dealer.  While Hoag
listened, petitioner and the dealer discussed petitioner's
MAC-10 firearm, which had been modified to operate as
an automatic.  The MAC-10 apparently is a favorite
among criminals.  It is small and compact, lightweight,
and can be equipped with a silencer.  Most important of
all, it can be devastating: A fully automatic MAC-10 can
fire more than 1,000 rounds per minute.  The dealer
expressed his interest in becoming the owner of a
MAC-10, and petitioner promised that he would discuss
selling the gun if his arrangement with another potential
buyer fell through.
  Unfortunately for petitioner, Hoag had contacts not only
with narcotics traffickers but also with law enforcement
officials.  In fact, she was a confidential informant.
Consistent with her post, she informed the Broward
County Sheriff's Office of petitioner's activities.  The
Sheriff's Office responded quickly, sending an undercover
officer to Hoag's motel room.  Several others were
assigned to keep the motel under surveillance.  Upon
arriving at Hoag's motel room, the undercover officer
presented himself to petitioner as a pawnshop dealer.
Petitioner, in turn, presented the officer with a
proposition: He had an automatic MAC-10 and silencer
with which he might be willing to part.  Petitioner then
pulled the MAC-10 out of a black canvas bag and showed
it to the officer.  The officer examined the gun and asked
petitioner what he wanted for it.  Rather than asking for
money, however, petitioner asked for drugs.  He was
willing to trade his MAC-10, he said, for two ounces of
cocaine.  The officer told petitioner that he was just a
pawnshop dealer and did not distribute narcotics.
Nonetheless, he indicated that he wanted the MAC-10
and would try to get the cocaine.  The officer then left,
promising to return within an hour.
  Rather than seeking out cocaine as he had promised,
the officer returned to the Sheriff's Office to arrange for
petitioner's arrest.  But petitioner was not content to wait.
The officers who were conducting surveillance saw him
leave the motel room carrying a gun bag; he then climbed
into his van and drove away.  The officers reported
petitioner's departure and began following him.  When law
enforcement authorities tried to stop petitioner, he led
them on a high-speed chase.  Petitioner eventually was
apprehended.
  Petitioner, it turns out, was well armed.  A search of
his van revealed the MAC-10 weapon, a silencer,
ammunition, and a -fast-feed- mechanism.  In addition,
the police found a MAC-11 machine gun, a loaded .45
caliber pistol, and a .22 caliber pistol with a scope and
homemade silencer.  Petitioner also had a loaded 9
millimeter handgun in his waistband.
  A grand jury sitting in the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida returned an indictment
charging petitioner with, among other offenses, two drug
trafficking crimes-conspiracy to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute and attempt to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U. S. C. 841(a)(1),
846, and 18 U. S. C. 2.  App. 3-9.  Most important here,
the indictment alleged that petitioner knowingly used the
MAC-10 and its silencer during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime.  Id., at 4-5.  Under 18 U. S. C.
924(c)(1), a defendant who so uses a firearm must be
sentenced to five years' incarceration.  And where, as
here, the firearm is a -machinegun- or is fitted with a
silencer, the sentence is 30 years.  See 924(c)(1) (-if the
firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped with a firearm
silencer,- the sentence is -thirty years-); 921(a)(23), 26
U. S. C. 5845(b) (term -machinegun- includes automatic
weapons).  The jury convicted petitioner on all counts.
  On appeal, petitioner argued that 924(c)(1)'s penalty
for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking offense covers only situations in which the
firearm is used as a weapon.  According to petitioner, the
provision does not extend to defendants who use a firearm
solely as a medium of exchange or for barter.  The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.  957 F. 2d
835 (1992).  The plain language of the statute, the court
explained, imposes no requirement that the firearm be
used as a weapon.  Instead, any use of -the weapon to
facilitate in any manner the commission of the offense-
suffices.  Id., at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted).
  Shortly before the Eleventh Circuit decided this case,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
arrived at the same conclusion.  United States v. Harris,
294 U. S. App. D. C. 300, 315-316, 959 F. 2d 246,
261-262 (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U. S. ___ (1992).
In United States v. Phelps, 877 F. 2d 28 (1989), however,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
trading a gun in a drug-related transaction could not
constitute use of a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking offense within the meaning of 924(c)(1).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
circuits.  506 U. S. ___ (1992).  We now affirm.

                           II
  Section 924(c)(1) requires the imposition of specified
penalties if the defendant, -during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime[,] uses or
carries a firearm.-  By its terms, the statute requires the
prosecution to make two showings.  First, the prosecution
must demonstrate that the defendant -use[d] or carrie[d]
a firearm.-  Second, it must prove that the use or carrying
was -during and in relation to- a -crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime.-
                            A
  Petitioner argues that exchanging a firearm for drugs
does not constitute -use- of the firearm within the
meaning of the statute.  He points out that nothing in the
record indicates that he fired the MAC-10, threatened
anyone with it, or employed it for self-protection.  In
essence, petitioner argues that he cannot be said to have
-use[d]- a firearm unless he used it as a weapon, since
that is how firearms most often are used.  See 957 F. 2d,
at 837 (firearm often facilitates drug offenses by protecting
drugs or protecting or emboldening the defendant).  Of
course, 924(c)(1) is not limited to those cases in which
a gun is used; it applies with equal force whenever a gun
is -carrie[d].-  In this case, however, the indictment
alleged only that petitioner -use[d]- the MAC-10.  App.
4.  Accordingly, we do not consider whether the evidence
might support the conclusion that petitioner carried the
MAC-10 within the meaning of 924(c)(1).  Instead we
confine our discussion to what the parties view as the
dispositive issue in this case: whether trading a firearm
for drugs can constitute -use- of the firearm within the
meaning of 924(c)(1).
  When a word is not defined by statute, we normally
construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.
See Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979)
(words not defined in statute should be given ordinary or
common meaning).  Accord, post, at 1 (-In the search for
statutory meaning, we give nontechnical words and
phrases their ordinary meaning-).  Surely petitioner's
treatment of his MAC-10 can be described as -use- within
the every day meaning of that term.  Petitioner -used- his
MAC-10 in an attempt to obtain drugs by offering to
trade it for cocaine.  Webster's defines -to use- as -[t]o
convert to one's service- or -to employ.-  Webster's New
International Dictionary of English Language 2806 (2d ed.
1949).  Black's Law Dictionary contains a similar
definition: -[t]o make use of; to convert to one's service;
to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a
purpose or action by means of.-  Black's Law Dictionary
1541 (6th ed. 1990).  Indeed, over 100 years ago we gave
the word -use- the same gloss, indicating that it means
-`to employ'- or -`to derive service from.'-  Astor v.
Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 213 (1884).  Petitioner's handling
of the MAC-10 in this case falls squarely within those
definitions.  By attempting to trade his MAC-10 for the
drugs, he -used- or -employed- it as an item of barter to
obtain cocaine; he -derived service- from it because it was
going to bring him the very drugs he sought.
  In petitioner's view, 924(c)(1) should require proof not
only that the defendant used the firearm but also that he
used it as a weapon.  But the words -as a weapon-
appear nowhere in the statute.  Rather, 924(c)(1)'s
language sweeps broadly, punishing any -us[e]- of a
firearm, so long as the use is -during and in relation to-
a drug trafficking offense.  See United States v. Long, 284
U. S. App. D. C. 405, 409-410, 905 F. 2d 1572, 1576-1577
(Thomas, J.) (although not without limits, the word -use-
is -expansive- and extends even to situations where the
gun is not actively employed), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 948
(1990).  Had Congress intended the narrow construction
petitioner urges, it could have so indicated.  It did not,
and we decline to introduce that additional requirement
on our own.
  Language, of course, cannot be interpreted apart from
context.  The meaning of a word that appears ambiguous
if viewed in isolation may become clear when the word is
analyzed in light of the terms that surround it.
Recognizing this, petitioner and the dissent argue that the
word -uses- has a somewhat reduced scope in 924(c)(1)
because it appears alongside the word -firearm.-
Specifically, they contend that the average person on the
street would not think immediately of a guns-for-drugs
trade as an example of -us[ing] a firearm.-  Rather, that
phrase normally evokes an image of the most familiar use
to which a firearm is put-use as a weapon.  Petitioner
and the dissent therefore argue that the statute excludes
uses where the weapon is not fired or otherwise employed
for its destructive capacity.  See post, at 2-4.  Indeed,
relying on that argument-and without citation to
authority-the dissent announces its own, restrictive
definition of -use.-  -To use an instrumentality,- the
dissent argues, -ordinarily means to use it for its intended
purpose.-  Post, at 1-2.
  There is a significant flaw to this argument.  It is one
thing to say that the ordinary meaning of -uses a firearm-
includes using a firearm as a weapon, since that is the
intended purpose of a firearm and the example of -use-
that most immediately comes to mind.  But it is quite
another to conclude that, as a result, the phrase also
excludes any other use.  Certainly that conclusion does not
follow from the phrase -uses . . . a firearm- itself.  As the
dictionary definitions and experience make clear, one can
use a firearm in a number of ways.  That one example of
-use- is the first to come to mind when the phrase -uses
. . . a firearm- is uttered does not preclude us from
recognizing that there are other -uses- that qualify as
well.  In this case, it is both reasonable and normal to
say that petitioner -used- his MAC-10 in his drug
trafficking offense by trading it for cocaine; the dissent
does not contend otherwise.  Post, at 2.
  The dissent's example of how one might -use- a cane,
post, at 2, suffers from a similar flaw.  To be sure, -use-
as an adornment in a hallway is not the first -use- of a
cane that comes to mind.  But certainly it does not follow
that the only -use- to which a cane might be put is
assisting one's grandfather in walking.  Quite the
opposite: The most infamous use of a cane in American
history had nothing to do with walking at all, see J.
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 150 (1988) (describing
the caning of Senator Sumner in the United States Senate
in 1856); and the use of a cane as an instrument of
punishment was once so common that -to cane- has
become a verb meaning -[t]o beat with a cane.-  Webster's
New International Dictionary of English Language, supra,
at 390.  In any event, the only question in this case is
whether the phrase -uses . . . a firearm- in 924(c)(1) is
most reasonably read as excluding the use of a firearm in
a gun-for-drugs trade.  The fact that the phrase clearly
includes using a firearm to shoot someone, as the dissent
contends, does not answer it.
  The dissent relies on one authority, the United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1992),
as -reflect[ing]- its interpretation of the phrase -uses . . .
a firearm.-  See post, at 2-3.  But the Guidelines do not
define -using a firearm- as using it for its intended
purposes, which the dissent apparently assumes are
limited to firing, brandishing, displaying, and possessing.
In fact, if we entertain for the moment the dubious
assumption that the Sentencing Guidelines are relevant
in the present context, they support the opposite view.
Section 2B3.1(b)(2), upon which the dissent relies, post, at
3, provides for increases in a defendant's offense level, and
therefore his sentence, if the offense involved a firearm.
The extent of the adjustment varies according to the
nature of the gun's involvement.  There is a seven-point
upward adjustment if the firearm -was discharged,-
2B3.1(b)(2)(A); a six-point enhancement if a gun was
-otherwise used,- 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added); and a
five-point adjustment if the firearm was brandished,
displayed, or possessed, 2B3.1(b)(2)(C).  Unless the six-
point enhancement for -othe[r] use[s]- is mere surplusage,
then there must be -uses- for a firearm other than its
-intended purposes- of firing, brandishing, displaying, or
possessing.  The dissent points out that there may be
some uses that are not firing or brandishing but constitute
use as a weapon nonetheless.  See post, at 4, n. 2.  But
nothing in 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) suggests that the phrase
-othe[r] use[s]- must be so limited.  On the contrary, it
is perfectly reasonable to construe 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) as
including uses, such as trading and bludgeoning, that do
not constitute use for the firearm's -intended purpose.-
  It is true that the Guidelines commentary defines
-`[o]therwise used'- as conduct that falls short of
-`discharg[ing] a firearm but [is] more than brandishing,
displaying, or possessing [it].'-  Post, at 3 (quoting USSG
1B1.1, comment., n. 1(g)).  That definition, however,
simply reflects the peculiar hierarchy of culpability
established in USSG 2B3.1(b)(2).  It clarifies that
between the most culpable conduct of discharging the
firearm and less culpable actions such as -brandishing,
displaying, or possessing,- lies a category of -othe[r]
use[s]- for which the Guidelines impose intermediate
punishment.  It does not by its terms exclude from its
scope trading, bludgeoning, or any other use beyond the
firearm's -intended purpose.-
  We are not persuaded that our construction of the
phrase -uses . . . a firearm- will produce anomalous
applications.  See post, at 2 (example of using a gun to
scratch one's head).  As we already have noted, see supra,
at 4, and will explain in greater detail later, infra, at
14-16, 924(c)(1) requires not only that the defendant
-use- the firearm, but also that he use it -during and in
relation to- the drug trafficking crime.  As a result, the
defendant who -uses- a firearm to scratch his head, see
post, at 2, or for some other innocuous purpose, would
avoid punishment for that conduct altogether: Although
scratching one's head with a gun might constitute -use,-
that action cannot support punishment under 924(c)(1)
unless it facilitates or furthers the drug crime; that the
firearm served to relieve an itch is not enough.  See infra,
at 14-16 (phrase -in relation to- requires, at a minimum,
that the use facilitate the crime).  Such a defendant would
escape the six-point enhancement provided in USSG
2B3.1(b)(2)(B) as well.  As the Guidelines definition of
-[o]therwise use[d]- makes clear, see USSG 1B1.1,
comment., n. 1(g), the six-point enhancement does not
apply unless the use is -more than- brandishing.  While
pistol-whipping a victim with a firearm might be -more
than- brandishing, scratching one's head is not.
  In any event, the -intended purpose- of a firearm is not
that it be used in any offensive manner whatever, but
rather that it be used in a particular fashion-by firing
it.  The dissent's contention therefore cannot be that the
defendant must use the firearm -as a weapon,- but rather
that he must fire it or threaten to fire it, -as a gun.-
Under the dissent's approach, then, even the criminal who
pistol-whips his victim has not used a firearm within the
meaning of 924(c)(1), for firearms are intended to be fired
or brandished, not used as bludgeons.  It appears that the
dissent similarly would limit the scope of the -othe[r]
use[s]- covered by USSG 2B3.1(b)(2)(B).  The universal
view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the
contrary.  No court of appeals ever has held that using
a gun to pistol-whip a victim is anything but the -use- of
a firearm; nor has any court ever held that trading a
firearm for drugs falls short of being the -use- thereof.
But cf. Phelps, 877 F. 2d, at 30 (holding that trading a
gun for drugs is not use -in relation to- a drug trafficking
offense).
  To the extent there is uncertainty about the scope of
the phrase -uses . . . a firearm- in 924(c)(1), we believe
the remainder of 924 appropriately sets it to rest.  Just
as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a
single provision of a statute.  As we have recognized:
-Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.  A
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme-because the same terminology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear,
or because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with
the rest of the law.-  United Savings Assn. of Texas
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S.
365, 371 (1988) (citations omitted).
Here, Congress employed the words -use- and -firearm-
together not only in 924(c)(1), but also in 924(d)(1),
which deals with forfeiture of firearms.  See United States
v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984)
(discussing earlier version of the statute).  Under
924(d)(1), any -firearm or ammunition intended to be
used- in the various offenses listed in 924(d)(3) is subject
to seizure and forfeiture.  Consistent with petitioner's
interpretation, 924(d)(3) lists offenses in which guns
might be used as offensive weapons.  See 924(d)(3)(A),
(B) (weapons used in a crime of violence or drug
trafficking offense).  But it also lists offenses in which the
firearm is not used as a weapon but instead as an item
of barter or commerce.  For example, any gun intended
to be -used- in an interstate -transfer, s[ale], trade, gi[ft],
transport, or deliver[y]- of a firearm prohibited under
922(a)(5) where there is a pattern of such activity, see
924(d)(3)(C), or in a federal offense involving -the
exportation of firearms,- 924(d)(3)(F), is subject to
forfeiture.  In fact, none of the offenses listed in four of
the six subsections of 924(d)(3) involves the bellicose use
of a firearm; each offense involves use as an item in
commerce.  Thus, it is clear from 924(d)(3) that one
who transports, exports, sells, or trades a firearm -uses-
it within the meaning of 924(d)(1)-even though those
actions do not involve using the firearm as a weapon.
Unless we are to hold that using a firearm has a different
meaning in 924(c)(1) than it does in 924(d)-and clearly
we should not, United Savings Assn., supra, at 371-we
must reject petitioner's narrow interpretation.
  The evident care with which Congress chose the
language of 924(d)(1) reinforces our conclusion in this
regard.  Although 924(d)(1) lists numerous firearm-
related offenses that render guns subject to forfeiture,
Congress did not lump all of those offenses together and
require forfeiture solely of guns -used- in a prohibited
activity.  Instead, it carefully varied the statutory
language in accordance with the guns' relation to the
offense.  For example, with respect to some crimes, the
firearm is subject to forfeiture not only if it is -used- but
also if it is -involved in- the offense.  924(d)(1).
Examination of the offenses to which the -involved in-
language applies reveals why Congress believed it
necessary to include such an expansive term. One of the
listed offenses, violation 922(a)(6), is the making of a
false statement material to the lawfulness of a gun's
transfer.  Because making a material misstatement in
order to acquire or sell a gun is not -use- of the gun even
under the broadest definition of the word -use,- Congress
carefully expanded the statutory language.  As a result,
a gun with respect to which a material misstatement is
made is subject to forfeiture because, even though the gun
is not -used- in the offense, it is -involved in- it.
Congress, however, did not so expand the language for
offenses in which firearms were -intended to be used,-
even though the firearms in many of those offenses
function as items of commerce rather than as weapons.
Instead, Congress apparently was of the view that one
could use a gun by trading it.  In light of the common
meaning of the word -use- and the structure and language
of the statute, we are not in any position to disagree.
  The dissent suggests that our interpretation produces
a -strange dichotomy- between -using- a firearm and
-carrying- one.  Post, at 5-6.  We do not see why that is
so.  Just as a defendant may -use- a firearm within the
meaning of 924(c)(1) by trading it for drugs or using it
to shoot someone, so too would a defendant -carry- the
firearm by keeping it on his person whether he intends
to exchange it for cocaine or fire it in self-defense.  The
dichotomy arises, if at all, only when one tries to extend
the phrase -uses . . . a firearm- to any use -for any
purpose whatever.-  Ibid.  For our purposes, it is
sufficient to recognize that, because 924(d)(1) includes
both using a firearm for trade and using a firearm as a
weapon as -us[ing] a firearm,- it is most reasonable to
construe 924(c)(1) as encompassing both of those -uses-
as well.
  Finally, it is argued that 924(c)(1) originally dealt with
use of a firearm during crimes of violence; the provision
concerning use of a firearm during and in relation to drug
trafficking offenses was added later.  Post, at 6.  From
this, the dissent infers that -use- originally was limited
to use of a gun -as a weapon.-  That the statute in its
current form employs the term -use- more broadly is
unimportant, the dissent contends, because the addition
of the words -`drug trafficking crime' would have been a
peculiar way to expand its meaning.-  Ibid.  Even if we
assume that Congress had intended the term -use- to
have a more limited scope when it passed the original
version of 924(c) in 1968, but see supra, at 6-8, we
believe it clear from the face of the statute that the
Congress that amended 924(c) in 1986 did not.  Rather,
the 1986 Congress employed the term -use- expansively,
covering both use as a weapon, as the dissent admits, and
use as an item of trade or barter, as an examination of
924(d) demonstrates.  Because the phrase -uses . . . a
firearm- is broad enough in ordinary usage to cover use
of a firearm as an item of barter or commerce, Congress
was free in 1986 so to employ it.  The language and
structure of 924 indicates that Congress did just that.
Accordingly, we conclude that using a firearm in a guns-
for-drugs trade may constitute -us[ing] a firearm- within
the meaning of 924(c)(1).
                            B
  Using a firearm, however, is not enough to subject the
defendant to the punishment required by 924(c)(1).
Instead, the firearm must be used -during and in relation
to- a -crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.-  18
U. S. C. 924(c)(1).  Petitioner does not deny that the
alleged use occurred -during- a drug trafficking crime.
Nor could he.  The indictment charged that petitioner and
his companion conspired to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute.  App. 3-4.  There can be no doubt that the
gun-for-drugs trade was proposed during and in
furtherance of that interstate drug conspiracy.  Nor can
it be contended that the alleged use did not occur during
the -attempt- to possess cocaine with which petitioner also
was charged, id., at 4; the MAC-10 served as an
inducement to convince the undercover officer to provide
petitioner with the drugs that petitioner sought.
  Petitioner, however, does dispute whether his use of the
firearm was -in relation to- the drug trafficking offense.
The phrase -in relation to- is expansive, cf. District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506
U. S. ___, ____ (1992) (slip op., at 4) (the phrase -relate
to- is -deliberately expansive- (internal quotation marks
omitted)), as the courts of appeals construing 924(c)(1)
have recognized, United States v. Phelps, 877 F. 2d, at
30 (-[t]he phrase `in relation to' is broad-); United States
v. Harris, 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 315, 959 F. 2d, at 261
(per curiam) (firearm is used -in relation to- the crime if
it -facilitate[s] the predicate offense in some way-).
Nonetheless, the phrase does illuminate 924(c)(1)'s
boundaries.  According to Webster's, -in relation to- means
-with reference to- or -as regards.-  Webster's New
International Dictionary of the English Language, at 2102.
The phrase -in relation to- thus, at a minimum, clarifies
that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with
respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or
involvement cannot be the result of accident or
coincidence.  As one court has observed, the -in relation
to- language -allay[s] explicitly the concern that a person
could be- punished under 924(c)(1) for committing a drug
trafficking offense -while in possession of a firearm- even
though the firearm's presence is coincidental or entirely
-unrelated- to the crime.  United States v. Stewart, 779
F. 2d 538, 539 (CA9 1985) (Kennedy, J.).  Instead, the
gun at least must -facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of
facilitating,- the drug trafficking offense.  Id., at 540.
Accord, United States v. Ocampo, 890 F. 2d 1363,
1371-1372 (CA7 1989); 957 F. 2d, at 837.
  We need not determine the precise contours of the -in
relation to- requirement here, however, as petitioner's use
of his MAC-10 meets any reasonable construction of it.
The MAC-10's presence in this case was not the product
of happenstance.  On the contrary, -[f]ar more than [in]
the ordinary case- under 924(c)(1), in which the gun
merely facilitates the offense by providing a means of
protection or intimidation, here -the gun . . . was an
integral part of the transaction.-  United States v. Phelps,
895 F. 2d 1281, 1283 (CA9 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).  Without it, the deal
would not have been possible.  The undercover officer
posing as a pawnshop dealer expressly told petitioner that
he was not in the narcotics business and that he did not
get involved with drugs.  For a MAC-10, however, he was
willing to see if he could track down some cocaine.
  Relying on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Phelps and on the legislative record,
petitioner insists that the relationship between the gun
and the drug offense in this case is not the type of
connection Congress contemplated when it drafted
924(c)(1).  With respect to that argument, we agree with
the District of Columbia Circuit's observation:
      -It may well be that Congress, when it drafted the
language of []924(c), had in mind a more obvious use
of guns in connection with a drug crime, but the
language [of the statute] is not so limited[;] nor can
we imagine any reason why Congress would not have
wished its language to cover this situation.  Whether
guns are used as the medium of exchange for drugs
sold illegally or as a means to protect the transaction
or dealers, their introduction into the scene of drug
transactions dramatically heightens the danger to
society.-  Harris, supra, at 316, 959 F. 2d, at 262.
One need look no further than the pages of the Federal
Reporter to verify the truth of that observation.  In
Phelps, supra, the defendant arranged to trade his
MAC-10 for chemicals necessary to make methampheta-
mine.  The Ninth Circuit held that the gun was not used
or carried -in relation to- the drug trafficking offense
because it was used as an item of barter and not as a
weapon.  The defendant, however, did not believe his
MAC-10's capabilities were so limited.  When he was
stopped for a traffic violation, -[t]he MAC 10, suddenly
transmogrified [from an item of commerce] into an
offensive weapon, was still in [the defendant's]
possession[.]  [He] opened fire and shot a deputy sheriff.-
Id., at 1288, n. 4 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
                            C
  Finally, the dissent and petitioner invoke the rule of
lenity.  Post, at 6-7.  The mere possibility of articulating
a narrower construction, however, does not by itself make
the rule of lenity applicable.  Instead, that venerable rule
is reserved for cases where, -[a]fter `seiz[ing] every thing
from which aid can be derived,'- the Court is -left with
an ambiguous statute.-  United States v. Bass, 404 U. S.
336, 347 (1971) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch
358, 386 (1805)).  Accord, Moskal v. United States, 498
U. S. 103, 108 (1990).  This is not such a case.  Not only
does petitioner's use of his MAC-10 fall squarely within
the common usage and dictionary definitions of the terms
-uses . . . a firearm,- but Congress affirmatively demon-
strated that it meant to include transactions like peti-
tioner's as -us[ing] a firearm- by so employing those terms
in 924(d).
  Imposing a more restrictive reading of the phrase -uses
. . . a firearm- does violence not only to the structure and
language of the statute, but to its purpose as well.  When
Congress enacted the current version of 924(c)(1), it was
no doubt aware that drugs and guns are a dangerous
combination.  In 1989, 56 percent of all murders in New
York City were drug related; during the same period, the
figure for the Nation's Capital was as high as 80 percent.
The American Enterprise 100 (Jan.-Feb. 1991).  The fact
that a gun is treated momentarily as an item of commerce
does not render it inert or deprive it of destructive
capacity.  Rather, as experience demonstrates, it can be
converted instantaneously from currency to cannon.  See
supra, at 16.  We therefore see no reason why Congress
would have intended courts and juries applying 924(c)(1)
to draw a fine metaphysical distinction between a gun's
role in a drug offense as a weapon and its role as an item
of barter; it creates a grave possibility of violence and
death in either capacity.
  We have observed that the rule of lenity -cannot dictate
an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds
with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of a
term.-  Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 596 (1990).
That observation controls this case.  Both a firearm's use
as a weapon and its use as an item of barter fall within
the plain language of 924(c)(1), so long as the use occurs
during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense; both
must constitute -uses- of a firearm for 924(d)(1) to make
any sense at all; and both create the very dangers and
risks that Congress meant 924(c)(1) to address.  We
therefore hold that a criminal who trades his firearm for
drugs -uses- it during and in relation to a drug trafficking
offense within the meaning of 924(c)(1).  Because the
evidence in this case showed that petitioner -used- his
MAC-10 machine gun and silencer in precisely such a
manner, proposing to trade them for cocaine, petitioner
properly was subjected to 924(c)(1)'s 30-year mandatory
minimum sentence.  The judgment of the Court of
Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed.
                                      It is so ordered.